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Casenote

Commission Control: The Court's Narrow
Holding in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Spurred
Congressional Action But Left Many
Questions Unanswered. So What Happens

Now?
By a 5-3 vote in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,' the United States Supreme
Court held that the military commissions established by President
George W. Bush to try al Qaeda members and other terrorists lacked the
"power to proceed because [their] structure and procedures" violate the
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")2 and the Geneva Conventions.3 In so holding, the Court exercised its power as a significant
check on presidential power, but left many questions unanswered. In
the wake of Hamdan, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act

1. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
2. Id. at 2759; 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
3. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 3,'Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention]. The court also held that enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
("DTA"), Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2200dd2200dd-1), did not revoke the Court's jurisdiction over cases pending at the time of the
DTA's enactment. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762-69.
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of 2006 ("MCA"'). The answers to the questions not addressed by the
Court in Hamdan will likely be revisited in future challenges to the
MCA.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center in New York City and the Department of Defense building
in Arlington, Virginia, Congress adopted the Authorization for Use of
Military Force ("AUMF").'
The AUMF is a joint resolution that
authorizes the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks ... in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States by such nations, organizations or persons."6 Acting pursuant to
the AUMF, the President ordered the invasion of Afghanistan. In
November 2001 Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national and
noncitizen of the United States, was captured by militia forces in
Afghanistan, turned over to the United States military, and later
detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'
On November 13, 2001, the President issued a military order that
governed the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism" ("November 13 Order").6 The November
13 Order provided that any "noncitizen for whom the President
determines 'there is reason to believe' that he or she (1) 'is or was' a
member of al Qaeda or (2) has engaged or participated in terrorist
activities aimed at or harmful to the United States . . . 'shall, when
tried, be tried by military commission.. . ,'" On July 3, 2003, the
President declared that Hamdan and five other noncitizen detainees
were subject to the November 13 Order.'0 Hamdan was appointed
counsel, who filed demands for charges and for a speedy trial under
Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")." The
demands were denied by the legal adviser to the Appointing Authority,

4. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (to
be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w).
5. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006); Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
6. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2.
7. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759-60.
8. Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
9. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting Military Order of November 13, 2001, 66 Fed.
Reg. at 57,834).
10. Id.
11. Id.; 10 U.S.C. § 810 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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who ruled
that Hamdan was not entitled to any of the protections of the
12
UCMJ.
On July 13, 2004, after Hamdan had already begun an action for
mandamus and habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington, the Government charged Hamdan with
conspiracy, alleging four overt acts committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy between 1996 and 2001.13 On November 8, 2004, after
Hamdan's petitions for writs of mandamus and habeas corpus were
transferred to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, the district court granted Hamdan's habeas petition and
stayed the commission's proceedings. 14 In granting Hamdan's petition,
the district court concluded that the President's authority to establish
military commissions was limited by the law of war, including the
Geneva Conventions, 5 and that the military commission's procedures
that allowed Hamdan to be convicted without being present for his full
trial violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions."
The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.17 The
court of appeals held that (1) the Geneva Conventions were not judicially
enforceable; 8 (2) even if the conventions were enforceable, they did not
apply to Hamdan; 9 and (3) the military commission procedures
established to try Hamdan did not violate the UCMJ.2 ° The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and held that the structure and procedures of

12. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2760.
13. Id. at 2760-61. The alleged overt acts were:
(1) [Hamdan] acted as Osama bin Laden's "bodyguard and personal driver,"
"believ[ing]" all the while that bin Laden "and his associates were involved in"
terrorist acts prior to and including the attacks of September 11, 2001; (2) he
arranged for transportation of, and actually transported, weapons used by al
Qaeda members and by bin Laden's bodyguards (Hamdan among them); (3) he
"drove or accompanied [O]sama bin Laden to various al Qa[e]da-sponsored
training camps, press conferences, or lectures," at which bin Laden encouraged
attacks against Americans; and (4) he received weapons training at al Qaedasponsored camps.
Id. at 2761 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 65a-75a (2005), Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (No. 05-184) (second and third alterations in original)).
14. Id. Further, during this time, the Combatant Status Review Tribunal "decided that
Hamdan's continued detention at Guantanamo Bay was warranted because he was an
'enemy combatant.'" Id.
15. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158-60 (D.D.C. 2004); Geneva
Convention, supra note 3.
16. See Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 166-68; see also Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2760-61.
17. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
18. Id. at 38-39.
19. Id. at 40-42.
20. Id. at 43.
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the President's military commissions violated both the UCMJ and the
Geneva Conventions.2 '
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The military commission is a military tribunal born of necessity "for
the investigation and punishment of violations of the laws of war and
other offences not cognizable by court-martial." 22 Military commissions

have been in existence since the earliest times of the United States, 3
developing principally as a supplement to the court-martial, for which
jurisdiction was "restricted by statute almost exclusively to members of
the military force and to certain specific offences defined in a written
code." 24 It was not until 1847, during the Mexican-American War, that
the military commission as it is known today was initiated. 5
Supreme Court precedent recognizes three types of valid military
commissions: martial law courts, military government courts, and law
of war courts.26 Martial law courts are "courts established by a
military commander whose forces have occupied a particular area within
the United States and displaced the civil government."2 7 Military
government courts are similar to martial law courts, except they are
used when a military government is established "either outside of the
United States or in areas within the United States in a state of
rebellion."28 Law of war courts are different from either martial law
courts or military government courts.29 They are convened "as an
appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the

21.

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759.

WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d ed. 1920).
23. See id. at 832-33 (noting that "[in our early wars.., cases which would now be
referred to a military commission were brought to trial before special courts-martial. Such
22.

was the case of Joshua Hett Smith ...
and] ... Arbuthnot and Ambrister ...

24. Id. at 831.

in 1780 ....
Louis Louaillier ...
in April, 1818....").

in March, 1815[,

The military commission did "not extend to many criminal acts,

especially of civilians, peculiar to time of war. . .

."

Id.

25. Id. at 832. At this time, jurisdiction was divided into two separate courts: the
"military commission" and the "council of war." Id. at 833. The military commissions were
essentially a replacement for the civilian criminal courts. See id. at 832. The council of
war, however, was a war court, used to try violations of the law of war. Id. at 832-33.
These two courts were later combined into one court known as the military commission.
Id. at 839; Major Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial:A
Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and JurisdictionalDistinctions Between the Two
Courts, 2002 ARMY LAW. 19, 28.
26. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775-76; MacDonnell, supra note 25, at 26.
27. MacDonnell, supra note 25, at 26.
28. Id.
29. Hamdan, 126 5: Ct. at 2776.
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law of war not ordinarily tried by court martial." 0 The validity of
military commissions is usually discussed in the context of three
considerations: (1) who has the power to convene a military commission
and under what circumstances such power may be exercised; (2) whether
the commission has jurisdiction over the offense; and (3) whether the
procedures used in the commission are sufficient to uphold the rights of
the person on trial."' Each of these considerations is different, depending on what type of military commission has been convened. This
section discusses only the law of war military commissions.
When and By Whom May a Military Commission Be Convened?

A.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to "provide for the
common Defence,"32 to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces," 3 to "declare War,"34 to "define and
punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations,""3 and to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
,,36 The Constitution makes the President the
the foregoing Powers.
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, v grants him the "executive Power,"38 and confers on him the duty to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed."39 These powers have been interpreted to give
both Congress and the President the authority to convene military
commissions as "an instrumentality for the more efficient execution of
the war powers vested in Congress and the power vested in the
President as Commander-in-chief in War." 4' There is little debate that
Congress and the President may, together, convene military commissions. However, when the President wishes to act without Congress's
approval, the exact balance of this concurrent power has been the subject
of disagreement, or at the very least, ambiguity.
In Ex parte Milligan,4 ' the Government argued that the authority to
convene military commissions was granted to the President through the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942).
See WINTHROP, supra note 22, at 835-42.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 14.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 11.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 18.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, c. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
WINTHROP, supra note 22, at 831.
71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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The Court, however, refused to decide that issue,

holding that neither Congress nor the President, under any circumstance, has the authority to try a nonmilitary United States citizen by
military commission when the courts are "open and.., unobstructed."43
The Court emphasized that no actual necessity for the commission existed--only a mere threat of necessity." Chief Justice Chase concurred
in the result but disagreed as to this issue.4" He believed that the
President did have the power to convene a military commission in such
a situation, as long as Congress authorized it." Further, the Chief
Justice stated that the President could not convene military commissions
without the sanction of Congress except "in cases of a controlling
necessity, which justifies what it compels."47 Therefore, Chief Justice
Chase believed that the President may convene a military commission
not only with congressional authorization, but also without it, as long as
a controlling necessity exists."
In Ex parte Quirin, 9 it was argued, as it was in Milligan, that the
President had the authority to convene military commissions without
Congress's approval.5 0 The Court, however, declined to decide this
issue.5' Instead, the Court held that Congress, using its constitutional
power to define and punish offenses against the laws of nations, had
explicitly authorized the President to use military commissions to try
offenses against the law of war through Articles 12 and 15 of the Articles
of War.5 2 Further, the Court held that by convening the commission,
the President merely exercised his powers as the Commander in Chief

42. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 121.

44. See id.
45. See id. at 132 (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 139-40.
47. Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
50. See id. at 29.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 27, 28. The Court determined that Article 12 did "not exclude from that
class 'any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals' and
who under Article 12 may be tried by court martial or under Article 15 by military
commission." Id. at 27 (emphasis added). The Court noted that Article 15 provided
"'the provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall
not be construed as depriving militarycommissions.., or other military tribunals
of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by
the law of war may be triable by such military commissions... or other military
tribunals.'"
Id. (emphasis added and omissions in original). Article 15 is almost identical to Article 21
of the UCMF. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774. See infra note 100.
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"to direct the performance of those functions which may constitutionally
be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war."53
Until Madsen v. Kinsella,54 the Court had always refrained from
discussing what power the President may have to convene military
commissions without Congress's approval.5 5 However, in Madsen the
Court seemed to address this issue. 6 In that case, the Court stated,
"In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power,
it appears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the
jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions. " " Madsen, though,
was not a situation in which the President attempted to act without the
authority of Congress.58 The Court recognized that Congress had
authorized the use of military commissions in Articles 2, 12, and 15 of
the Articles of War and expressly reserved jurisdiction over violations of
the law of war.5" Therefore, while the Court appeared to expand the
President's authority to convene military commissions without Congress's approval, it merely followed its previous holding in Quirin61 that
the President was acting within Congress's grant of authority.6 '
B.

The Jurisdictionof the Law of War Military Commission

In order to be tried before a military commission, an offense must have
been committed (1) "within the field of ... command of the convening
commander;" (2) in "the theatre of war or a place where military
government or martial law may legally be exercised;" and (3) "within the
[time] period of the war or of the exercise of military government or

53. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28.
54. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
55. See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. 1; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
56. See Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 341.
59. Id. at 350-52.
60. 317 U.S. 1. Quirin was followed by In re Yamashita, which further defined the
scope of the President's war power. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7-11. The Court declined to
hold that military commissions may not be convened after the cessation of hostilities if(1)
the offense was committed before the cessation of hostilities and (2) there has been no
official recognition of peace by treaty or proclamation. Id. at 12. The Court explained:
The war power, from which the commission derives its existence, is not limited to
victories in the field, but carries with it the inherent power to guard against the
immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy, at least in ways Congress has
recognized, the evils which the military operations have produced.
Id.

61. See Madsen, 343 U.S. at 350-52. But see MacDonnell, supra note 25, at 22, 24.
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martial law." 2 Also, the law of war military commission may only try
"[vliolations of the laws and usages of war," or violations of military
orders or regulations that cannot legally be tried by military commissions. 63
C.

ProceduralLimitations on the Law of War Military Commission

Historically, military commissions followed the same procedural rules
that were placed on courts-martial.' Military commissions permitted
objections, formally arraigned the prisoner, allowed counsel, received
evidence, heard argument, and sentenced.65 The commission usually
followed the established rules of law and evidence, albeit in a less
technical form.66 However, because Congress never defined the rules
for such proceedings, failure to fully comply with the rules of courtsmartial did not render the commission illegal.67 If justice required, the
rules and principles of military commissions were liberally construed.68
The procedures of a military commission were first challenged in Ex
parte Quirin.6 9 In Quirin the Court refrained from deciding whether
Congress may proscribe the procedures of the commission, stating that
"the Articles [of War] could not at any stage of the proceedings afford
any basis for issuing the writ."70 However, the Court's reasoning was
split. Some members of the Court argued that the Articles of War were
not intended to regulate military commissions and therefore, were
inapplicable.7 1 The other members argued that even if Congress could
regulate the procedures of the commission through the Articles of War,
the particular Articles in question did not prohibit the procedures
used.72 Therefore, the Court essentially held that military commissions

62. WINTHROP, supra note 22, at 836-37. Also, the trial must have been "had within
the theatre of war, military government, or martial law," and not somewhere that the civil
courts were open and available. Id. at 836. However, this last requirement has not always
been followed. Id. at 836-37.
63. Id. at 839. If the military commission is a martial law or military government
court, then it may also try "[c]rimes and statutory offences cognizable by State or U.S.
courts, and which would properly be tried by such courts if open and acting." Id.
64. See id. at 841.
65. Id. at 841-42.
66. Id. at 842.
67. Id. at 841.
68. Id. at 842.
69. 317 U.S. at 46-47.
70. Id. at 47.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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have no procedural limitations above that which is made a part of the
law of war-not even those that govern courts-martial.73
In In re Yamashita,'4 the military commission that tried Yamashita
followed procedures that allowed evidence that "'would have probative
value in the mind of a reasonable man,'" including "affidavits, depositions or other statements taken by officers detailed for that purpose by
military authority."7 5 There the Court held that neither the Articles of
War nor the law of war applied to Yamashita, and therefore, neither
placed any procedural restrictions on his military commission.76
However, in a lengthy dissent, Justice Rutledge condemned the
procedures used to try Yamashita as, inter alia, an unconstitutional
departure from due process resulting in an unfair trial.7
Justice
Rutledge stated that due process applies to "all men, whether citizens,
aliens, alien enemies or enemy belligerents," and every "departure" from
due process "weakens the tradition, whether it touches the high or the
78
low, the powerful or the weak, the triumphant or the conquered."
Justice Rutledge concluded by quoting Thomas Paine: "'He that would
make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates
this duty he establishes a precedent that will
79
reach to himself.'
D.

Military Detainees and Habeas Corpus

In discussing the trial of detainees by military commission, the method
by which those procedures are challenged, habeas corpus, must also be
addressed. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, ° a plurality of the Court, relying
on the AUMF and longstanding law of war principles, authorized for the
duration of the military conflict the detention of American citizens who
had been determined to be "enemy combatants."8
Justice Scalia,
dissenting, argued that Hamdi should be released "unless (1) criminal
proceedings are promptly brought, or (2) Congress has suspended the
writ of habeas corpus." 2 He further pointed to the Suspension Clause

73.

See generally Quirin, 317 U.S. 1.

74.
75.

327 U.S. 1 (1946).
Id. at 18.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

19-20.
78-80 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
42.

81 (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 588 (Philip S.
Foner, Ph.D., ed., 1945)).

80. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
81. Id. at 521-22.
82. Id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the Constitution, 3 which states that the only time suspension of the
writ is constitutional is during rebellion or invasion. 4 But Justice
Scalia explicitly declined to decide whether the attacks of September 11,
2001 constituted an invasion or, even if they did, whether the attacks
85
would justify suspension several years later.
86
In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear
habeas petitions from "foreign nationals captured abroad in connection
with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base"
in Cuba.87 In so holding, the Court declined to apply any presumption
that congressional legislation does not have extraterritorial application
and stated that in any event, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is within "'the
territorial jurisdiction'" of the United States for habeas purposes.8 8 As
a final note regarding habeas corpus, in 2005 Congress enacted the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 ("DTA), 8 9 which stated that "no court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained.. . at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."' °

III.
A.

THE COURT'S RATIONALE

The Power of the President to Convene a Military Commission

The Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld91 first dismissed two preliminary
issues.92 Next, the Court addressed whether the President has the

83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2.
84. 542 U.S. at 578.
85. Id.
86. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
87. Id. at 470, 485.
88. Id. at 480.
89. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2200dd-2200dd-1).
90. Id.
91. 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006).
92. See id. at 2762-69, 2769-72. Before discussing the merits of Hamdan's claims that
the military commission lacked authority to try him, the Court first dealt with two
preliminary issues: (1) whether the newly enacted DTA stripped the Court of jurisdiction
to hear Hamdan's petition and (2) whether considerations of comity required the Court to
refrain from hearing Hamdan's petition, regardless of jurisdiction. See id. As to the first
issue, the Court held that the DTA did not strip the Court of jurisdiction over pending
cases. Id. at 2769. The Court reasoned that Congress specifically stated that sections
1005(e)(2) and (3) of the DTA applied to pending cases. Id. at 2764. However, Congress
did not place that same language in section 1005(e)(1), the provision that stripped the
Court of jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus filed by detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. See id. Here, the Court stated, the principle of statutory interpretation that "a
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power under the Constitution to convene military commissions.9 3 The
Court analyzed past Supreme Court cases, the UCMJ, 94 the DTA, 95
and the AUMF,9" and held that "at most," these sources "acknowledge
a general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in
circumstances where justified under the 'Constitution and laws,'
including the law of war."9 7 The Court first discussed Ex parte
Quirin,9" where the Court held that Congress had authorized the use
of military commissions through Article 15 of the Articles of War.99
The Court noted that Article 21 of the UCMJ contains language that is
"substantially identical" to Article 15 of the Articles of War. °0 However, the Court explained that Quirin did not expand the scope of
presidential power.'01 Instead, it merely preserved the power already

negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory
provision that is included in other provisions of the same statute" controls. Id. at 2765.
Further, the presumption against retroactivity had no effect in this case. See generally
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749. A "jurisdiction-conferring or jurisdiction-stripping statute ...
'takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the
case.'" Id. at 2765 (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508 (1916)). When a
statute has no retroactive effect, the presumption against retroactivity does not apply. Id.
Therefore, the Court concluded the statute would have applied to pending cases if not for
the rule of statutory construction that "dictate[d] otherwise." Id. Thus, the Court held that
Congress did not intend for section 1005(e)(1) to apply to pending cases. Id. at 2769.
As to the second issue, the Court held that the comity considerations discussed in
Schlesingerv. Councilman,420 U.S. 738 (1975)-that courts should refrain from interfering
in ongoing courts-martial proceedings against members of the armed forces---did not apply
to Hamdan. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2770-71. First, the Court noted that Hamdan is not
a member of the United States armed forces; therefore, concern for military discipline is
not implicated. Id. at 2771. Second, the Court stated that the military commission is not
a part of the integrated system of military courts established by Congress. Id. Therefore,
the Court reasoned that intervening in an ongoing proceeding does not interfere with "the
balance that Congress struck between military preparedness and fairness to individual
service members" when it created the military courts. Id. at 2770. Thus, the Court held
that Councilman did not prevent the Court from hearing Hamdan's petition. Id. at 2771.
93. See id. at 2772-75.
94. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
95. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2200dd-2200dd-1).
96. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
97. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2775.
98. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
99. Id. at 28-29.
100. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774. Article 21 of the UCMJ states: "The provisions of
this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military
commissions ... of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions. . . ." 10 U.S.C. § 821
(2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
101. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774.

752

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

afforded the President under the Constitution, including an "express
condition that the President . . . comply with the law of war."'0 2 The
Court further explained that neither the AUMF nor the DTA expanded
the President's power. °3 According to the Court, the AUMF only
authorized the President to use his already-existing war power, which
includes the ability to convene military commissions when appropriate.1 °4
Further, while the DTA recognizes the existence of the
Guantanamo Bay military commissions, it does not expand the scope of
the President's war power to convene them."°5 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA recognize a
presidential power to convene military commissions "where justified
under the 'Constitution and laws.'"'"
B. The Military Commission Did Not Have JurisdictionOver the
Offense Charged
A plurality of the Court0" concluded that Hamdan's military commission was deficient.'0 8 The plurality stated that four preconditions
must exist for a military commission to be valid: (1) the offense must
have been committed within the convening commander's field of
command; (2) the offense must have occurred during the period of the
war; (3) the offender must have violated the law of war; and (4) the
offense charged must be a violation of the law of war "'cognizable by
military tribunals only.'"'0 9
According to the plurality, Hamdan's military commission failed in
three respects."0 First, the alleged offense was not committed in a
theater of war."' Second, the alleged offense did not occur during a
period of war because the charge against Hamden alleged conspiracy
extending from 1996 to November 2001.12 All but two months of the

102. Id.
103. Id. at 2775.
104. Id.
105. See id. The Court specifically reserved judgment on whether "'the Constitution
and laws of the United States are applicable' in reviewing such decisions" and also on
whether "the 'standards and procedures' used to try Hamdan and other detainees actually
violate the 'Constitution and laws.'" Id. (quoting Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(3)).
106. Id. (quoting Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(3)).
107. Id. at 2759. Only Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in this
part of the opinion. Id.
108. See id. at 2777-78.
109. Id. at 2777 (quoting WINTHRop, supra note 22, at 839).
110. See id. at 2777-78.
111. Id. at 2778.
112. Id. at 2777-78.
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alleged conspiracy occurred before the September 11, 2001 attacks and
the enactment of the AUMF."3 Therefore, the offense occurred neither
in a theater of war nor during time of war."4 Third, the plurality
stated that the offense charged, conspiracy, is not an offense recognized
under the law of war."' According to the plurality, Congress had not
exercised its constitutional authority to define conspiracy as a war
crime," 6 and in the absence of such a statute, plain and unambiguous
precedent must exist." 7 The plurality found no such precedent." 8
Also, the plurality determined that Quirin did not control." 9 The
plurality noted that while the saboteurs in Quirin were charged with
conspiracy, the Court did not discuss the charge. 2 ° However, according to the plurality, the Quirin Court did "place[] special emphasis on
the completion of an offense."' 2 ' Further, the plurality claimed that
international sources do not recognize conspiracy as a violation of the
law. 22 Therefore, the plurality concluded that the military commission lacked jurisdiction to try Hamdan."
Last, the plurality stated
that the deficiencies in the charge were "indicative of a broader inability
on the Executive's part here to satisfy the most basic precondition...
for establishment of military commissions: military necessity."' 24
C. The Military Commission's ProceduresViolated the UCMJ and
the Geneva Conventions
With regard to the commission's procedures, the Court stated that
although the President is authorized by Congress to convene military
commissions, he is also restricted by Congress's requirement that he
comply with the UCMJ and the law of war, including the Geneva

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2779.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2780.
118. Id.
Historically, the common law governing military commissions did not
recognize a mere intention to violate the law of war, even when overt acts were committed
in furtherance of that intention, unless the overt acts by themselves violated the law of war
or constituted an attempt. Id. at 2781.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2782.
122. Id. at 2784.
123. Id. at 2785.
124. Id.
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Conventions. 12 The Court held that the procedures established 1to
try
26
Hamdan violated the UCMJ as well as the Geneva Conventions.
1. The Procedures Established to Try Hamdan Violated the
UCMJ. In holding that the procedures established for trial by the
military commission violated the UCMJ, the Court relied principally on
subsections (a) and (b) of Article 36 of the UCMJ. 2 7 These provisions
place two restrictions on the procedures the President may use in a
military commission: (1) no rule may be "contrary to or inconsistent
with" the UCMJ 2s and (2) the rules must be "uniform insofar as
practicable." 129 The Court construed these provisions to mean that the
rules for military commissions and for courts-martial must be the same,
unless impracticable. 3 ° The Court then determined that no official
statement of impracticability had been made and that nothing else
demonstrated that applying the court-martial rules would be impracticable.' 3 ' However, the Court added, the procedural rules established to
try Hamdan deviated from the court-martial rules in several respects. 3 2 First, normal evidence rules did not apply.' 3 Unlike normal
rules for evidence, any evidence that "would have probative value to a
reasonable person," including hearsay and evidence obtained through

125. Id. at 2786; Geneva Convention, supra note 3.
126. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786.
127. See id. at 2790. Subsection (a) of Article 36 of the UCMJ provides that the
procedures, including modes of proof, [in cases before] courts-martial, military
commissions and other military tribunals... may be prescribed by the President
by regulations which shall, so far as he considerspracticable,apply the principles
of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases
in the United States district courts, but which may not, ...
be contrary to or
inconsistent with this chapter.
10 U.S.C.S. § 836(a) (2006) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) provides: "All rules and
regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable." 10 U.S.C.S.
§ 836(b) (2001 & Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
128. 10 U.S.C.S. § 836(a).
129. Id. § 836(b).
130. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790. The Court noted the difference in choice of language
between subsection (a) and subsection (b). Subsection (a), the Court stated, allows the
President to make different rules for military courts than are used in the district courts
insofar as "he considers practicable.'" Id. at 2791 (quoting 10 U.S.C.S. § 836(a)). However
in subsection (b), Congress chose to require uniformity among courts-martial and military
commissions "Insofar as practicable.'" Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C.S. § 836(b)). The Court
determined these to be different requirements. Id.
131. Id. at 2791-92.
132. Id. at 2790-91.
133. Id.
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Second, for various
coercion, was admissible against Hamdan."
reasons not present in a court-martial proceeding, Hamdan could be
that
Therefore, the Court determined
excluded from his own trial.'
136
the procedures established to try Hamdan violated the UCMJ.

2. The Procedures Established to Try Hamdan Violated the
Geneva Conventions. The Court further concluded that the
procedural rules established to try Hamdan also violated the Geneva
The Court's determination was largely based on a
Conventions. 137
statutory interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 38 part of the law of war which is made applicable to military
commissions by Article 21 of the UCMJ.

39

The Court discussed the

language of Common Article 3, which states that in a "'conflict not of an
international character'" that occurs in the territory of one of the "High
Contracting Parties," all parties are required to apply certain provisions
that protect people "'taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces ... placed hors de combat ... by deten-

tion.'"'4 ° One provision that the contracting parties are bound to apply
"prohibits 'the passing of sentences ... without previous judgment

pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.'"' 4' The Court interpreted the term "'not of an international
char-acter"' to mean not between nations. 142 Therefore, the Court held
that Common Article 3 applies to the United States' war against al
Qaeda because al Qaeda is not a nation."3 Further, the Court reasoned that the military commission convened to try Hamdan was not a

134. Id. at 2786.
135. Id. at 2792.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2793.
138. Id. at 2795. Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is often called "Common Article
3" because it is in all four Geneva Conventions. Id.
139. See id. at 2794. The Geneva Conventions are a part of the law of war. See id. at
2786. Further, "compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority
set forth in Article 21 is granted." Id. at 2794. Therefore, Hamdan may seek enforcement
of the laws of war in United States courts. See id.
140. Id. at 2795 (quoting Geneva Convention, supra note 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75
U.N.T.S. at 136).
141. Id. (quoting Geneva Convention, supra note 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at
138).
142. Id. at 2795-96 (quoting Geneva Convention, supra note 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75
U.N.T.S. at 136).
143. See id.
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"'regularly constituted court.'"'" At a minimum, in order for a
military commission to be regularly constituted, a "'practical need'" must
Here, the
explain its "'deviations from court-martial practice.'""'
Court stated, there was no such need.'"
Last, a plurality of the Court interpreted the Geneva Conventions'
requirement of a trial that affords "'all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples'" to include the right to
be tried in one's presence.'4 7 Because Hamdan could be convicted on
undisclosed evidence presented in his absence, the plurality concluded
that his military commission violated the Geneva Conventions.'"
D. The Dissents
Three dissenting opinions were written by Justices Scalia, 149 Thomas, 150 and Alito.' 5 ' Justice Thomas discussed in his dissent, inter

144.

See id. at 2796-97 (quoting Geneva Convention, supra note 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75

U.N.T.S. at 138).
145. Id. at 2797 (quoting Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2804 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2797-98 (quoting Geneva Convention, supra note 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75
U.N.T.S. at 138). Justice Kennedy concurred with the Court's decision, but because the
Court decided that the military commission was unauthorized under the UCMJ, he found
it unnecessary to decide several issues. Id. at 2808-09 (Kennedy J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy would not decide three issues: (1) whether the conspiracy charge against
Hamdan was valid; (2) "the merits of other limitations on military commissions described
as elements of the common law of war;" and (3) whether Common Article 3, by requiring
courts to "'afford[] all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples'" requires the accused to be present for the entirety of his trial. Id. at
2809 (quoting Geneva Convention, supra note 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138).
Justice Kennedy, however, did discuss the separation of powers issues raised by military
commissions, stating that they raise "concerns of the highest order." Id. at 2800. Citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Justice Kennedy argued that
because the President exceeded the limits for military commissions imposed by Congress,
this case is one in which the President's power is at its lowest force. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct.
at 2800-01, 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Therefore, he argued, Congress's limitations
are binding upon the President. See id.
148. Id. at 2797-98 (plurality opinion).
149. See id. at 2810-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissent focused on the
issues of jurisdiction and abstention. See id. Because these issues were not given much
discussion in this Note, Justice Scalia's dissent will not be discussed.
150. See id. at 2823-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was joined by Justice
Scalia and Justice Alito in all but parts I, II.C.1, and HLI.B.2. Id. at 2823.
151. See id. at 2849-54 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito was joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas. Id. at 2849. Justice Alito dissented because he believed Hamdan's
commission was a "'regularly constituted court.'" Id. at 2850 (quoting Geneva Convention,
supra note 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138). First, he stated that Common Article
3 does not require uniformity in structure and composition among all military courts. Id.
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alia, the separation of powers."' He argued that the Constitution
confers upon the President a broad power to protect the security of the
nation "in the manner he deems fit." 5 s This power is at its greatest,
he stated, when the President's actions were either expressly or
impliedly authorized, and a congressional authorization of certain action
does not imply a congressional disapproval of actions not specifically
authorized." Justice Thomas argued that Article 21 of the UCMJ, as
well as the AUMF, authorized Hamdan's military commission. 5
Therefore, Justice Thomas would hold that the President was acting in
the realm of his greatest power, and his actions should be given great
deference. 15
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

57

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld is foremost an important check on presidential power.'58 The importance of Hamdan as a check on presidential
power may be most apparent when considered in light of the "unitary
executive theory" of constitutional interpretation.5 9
The unitary
executive theory suggests that "the authority to enforce federal law and
to implement federal policy rests exclusively in the executive
branch.""6 This theory has been criticized for being "designed to
justify and make constitutional a type of presidency that is largely
insulated from the checks and balances normally associated with a

at 2851. Second, Justice Alito argued that even if the UCMJ requires some limited
uniformity, failure to fully comply with that requirement does not render the commission
illegal. Id. at 2852-53. Rather, according to Justice Alito, the proper remedy is to proscribe
the use of particular procedures. Id. at 2853. Third, Justice Alito believed that all of the
elements required by Common Article 3 had been satisfied: the military commission
qualified as a court; the commission was appointed, set up, and established in compliance
with domestic law; and the commission's procedures, 'taken as a whole," did not render the
commission illegal. Id. Further, Justice Alito stated that review is available for any
procedural improprieties that might arise. Id.
152. Id. at 2823-49 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2823.
154. Id. at 2823-24.
155. Id. at 2825. Justice Thomas argued that Article 21, alone, authorized Hamdan's
military commission, but that the UCMJ in combination with the AUMF represents a
.complete congressional sanction of the President's exercise of his commander-in-chief
authority." Id.
156. Id. at 2824.
157. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
158. See id. at 2798.
159. See Karl Manheim & Allan Ides, The Unitary Executive: Federal Courts Have
Almost Always RebuffedAssertions of Unchecked Power by the Executive Branch, L.A. LAW.,
Sept. 2006, at 27-32.
160. Id. at 27.
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republican form of government." 16 1 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 162 Justice
Thomas stated that "[t]he power to protect the Nation 'ought to exist
without limitation.'"'6 He stated further that "judicial interference in
[foreign affairs and national security] destroys the purpose of vesting
primary responsibility in a unitary Executive."'
Therefore, under
Justice Thomas's view of the unitary executive, the President may act
in the realm
of national security unchecked by either Congress or the
65
Court.'
Presidential signing statements have also been used to further this
view of presidential power. While the signing statement is not new, the
way in which the President is using them is new."
In these signing
statements, the President often gives the Executive's interpretation of
laws passed by the legislature. 167 The reality of these signing statements is that the President has signaled his intent to disobey more than
750 statutes'6 by interpreting legislation in a way that does not
interfere with "the President's Constitutional authority ... to supervise
the unitary executive branch." 6 9 When viewed in light of this theory,

161. Id. at 28.
162. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
163. Id. at 580 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 200
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)) (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 582 (emphasis omitted).
165. See id. at 580-82.
166. See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundredsof Laws: PresidentCites Power of
His Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al. The author states:
Far more than any predecessor, Bush has been aggressive about declaring his
right to ignore vast swaths of laws [,] many of which he says infringe on power he
believes the Constitution assigns to him alone as the head of the executive branch
or the commander in chief of the military.
Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Statement on Signing the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOc. 2199, 2199-2200 (Dec. 21, 2006). The signing statement states:
Because the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary
executive branch and take care that the laws be faithfully executed cannot be
made by law subject to a requirement to consult with congressional committees
or to involve them in executive decisionmaking, the executive branch shall
construe the references in the provisions to consulting to require only notification ....
Such provisions, if construed as mandatory rather than advisory, would
impermissibly interfere with the President's constitutional authorities to conduct
the Nation's foreign affairs, including protection of American citizens and
American military and other Government personnel abroad, and to supervise the
unitary executive branch.
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Hamdan is a reaffirmation that both the Court and Congress still
operate as significant checks of presidential power-even on matters of
national security. The Court's refusal to defer to the President in
Hamdan indicates that the Court has not wholly accepted the unitary
executive theory. Therefore, future challenges to signing statements
that ignore, disobey, or reinterpret congressional law will potentially be
deemed unconstitutional.
While Hamdan is definitely important as a significant check on
presidential power, Hamdan is equally important when considering
challenges to the newly enacted MCA.17 0 The MCA, a direct response
to the Court's decision in Hamdan, adopted most of the military commission procedures that were held violative of the UCMJ' 7 ' and the
Geneva Conventions in Hamdan.172 With congressional approval of the

Id.
170. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (to
be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a-950w).
171. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
172. See Military Commissions Act § 948a, 120 Stat. at 2601-02. The MCA explicitly
authorizes the President to convene military commissions to try "alien unlawful enemy
combatants;" states that the military commission is a "regularly constituted court, affording
all the necessary 'judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples' for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions;" creates a new
definition of "unlawful enemy combatant;" and prohibits evidence obtained by torture but
does not prohibit all evidence obtained by coercion. Military Commissions Act §§ 948a(1),
948b(a), 948b(f)-(g), 120 Stat. at 2602.
Under section 948r, potentially coerced statements made before the enactment of the
DTA on December 30, 2005 are subject to a different standard than statements made after
the enactment of the DTA. Statements where the level of coercion is disputed that were
made before the enactment of the DTA will only be admitted if: (1) "the totality of the
circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value" and
(2) "the interests of justice would best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence." Military Commissions Act § 948r(c)(1)-(2), 120 Stat. at 2607. However,
statements where the level of coercion is disputed that were made after the enactment of
the DTA will be admitted only if: (1) "the totality of the circumstances renders the
statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value," (2) "the interests of justice
would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence," and (3) "the
interrogation methods used to obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment prohibited by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005."
Military Commissions Act § 948r(d)(1)-(3), 120 Stat. at 2607. Therefore, statements made
before December 30, 2005 may be admitted into evidence even though they were obtained
through the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, as long as they meet the preDTA test.
Further, the MCA allows hearsay to be admitted if the detainee gets proper notice and
the evidence is determined to be reliable; provides that the accused must be present for all
stages of the trial unless for reasons of safety or disruption; makes classified information
privileged but allows for alternative forms of disclosure that allow some of the information
to be presented to the accused; and provides that no person "may invoke the Geneva
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military commissions and their procedures, the statutory interpretation
and separation of powers issues that were the bases of the Court's
reasoning in Hamdan no longer exist. Hamdan, however, will inevitably
be the case that commentators look to in an effort to predict the outcome
of future challenges to the MCA. Because the Court decided Hamdan
on statutory grounds, it left many questions unanswered. The answers
to these questions will be important to future challenges against the
MCA.
First, the Court did not address whether, or to what extent, military
combatants held in Guantanamo Bay or similar installations are
afforded rights under the Constitution. The Court's decision in Rasul v.
Bush 173 may be a hint as to how the Court will decide this issue in the
future. In Rasul the Court stated that Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is
within "the territorial jurisdiction" of the United States for habeas
purposes.' 74 The "same basis for applying habeas statutes to Guantanamo Bay detainees also supports recognizing their substantive constitutional rights." 75 The analysis with regard to habeas corpus or other
constitutional provisions "should apply in both contexts or in neither.""76
' Therefore, the Court may use this analysis in applying some
constitutional rights to military detainees held in Guantanamo Bay. If
the Court were to adopt this analysis and confer constitutional rights on
the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, some provisions of the MCA could be
unconstitutional. However, the Court's narrow holding in Hamdan
suggests that most constitutional liberties will not be granted to
noncitizen detainees.
Second, the Court did not decide whether a congressional denial of the
Court's jurisdiction to hear an original writ of habeas corpus is an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ. 77 In recent cases, including

Conventions as a source of rights" in any court of the United States. Military Commissions
Act §§ 948b(g), 949a(b)(1)(B), 949d(e)-(f)(2). Last, the MCA modifies the DTA to prohibit
any court from hearing habeas petitions filed by detainees who have been determined (or
who are awaiting determination) to have been "properly detained as an enemy combatant"
and to limit other review a detainee may seek to an appeal of either a CSRT or a military
commission decision. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241(e)(1)-(2) (2001 & Supp. 2006).
173. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
174. Id. at 480. The Court based this statement on the terms of the Guantanamo Bay
lease between the United States and Cuba, which allows the United States to exercise
"'complete jurisdiction and control' over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may
continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses." Id. (quoting Lease of Lands
for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 16-23, 1903, 6 Bevans 1113).
175. Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and JudicialConscience at War,
84 WASH.U. L. REV. 99, 171 n.331 (2006).
176. Id.
177. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764.
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Hamdan, the Court has given brief discussion to this issue. As Justice
Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Constitution
allows for suspension of the writ only during a time of rebellion or
invasion. 7 ' While Scalia refused to decide if the September 11, 2001
attacks satisfy this requirement of the Suspension Clause, his analysis
of the issue left only two ways to deal with military detainees: either (1)
release them or (2) charge them, unless habeas has been suspended. 7 9
Considering these two limited options in the absence of habeas
suspension, it seems likely that Justice Scalia would, instead, accept an
argument that the requirements of the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution 8 ° have been met.
The Court in Hamdan, however, seemed less amenable to the idea of
suspending the writ. While refraining to decide the issue, the Court did
discuss in dicta Hamdan's argument that the DTA unconstitutionally
suspended habeas corpus,' 8 ' stating that "'the denial to this court of
appellate jurisdiction' to consider an original writ of habeas corpus would
'greatly weaken the efficacy of the writ.' " 82 If the Court does choose
to address the constitutionality of the MCA's habeas suspension, the
decision will probably turn on the issue of whether the September 11,
2001 attacks constitute a "rebellion or invasion" under the Suspension
Clause.'83 Even if the Court does find that the attacks constituted an
invasion, in light of the singular nature of the attack and the time that
has passed since, the Court will probably not hold that the invasion
continued until 2006. Further, the Court's brief discussion of habeas in
Hamdan and its previous holding in Rasul'84 indicate that, if challenged, the Court will likely decide that habeas has been unconstitutionally suspended.
THOMAS M. GORE

178. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. See id.
180. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
181. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764.
182. Id. (quoting Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 102-03 (1869)).
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. However, the Court may decide the issue, as it did
in Hamdan, on more narrow grounds. One probable statutory argument with regard to
habeas corpus will be that Congress has not suspended the writ in the MCA, but because
Congress has expanded the reach of the writ by statute, it can also narrow the reach by
statute without infringing on any constitutional provisions.
184. 542 U.S. at 470, 563.

